Credit versus Bubble Explanation
The paper runs a race between the credit view and the asset bubble view of the 1920's experience. Yet the difference between the two views is not clearly spelled out. The rise in asset prices presumably had to be financed and presumably this came largely from bank credit. Moreover the indicator that the authors use contains equity prices, which they show is the component which has the most predictive power. So, is the difference between the two approaches based on the extent to which credit expansion was done only to finance fundamentals based and not bubble based expenditure. Or is it based on the wealth effect of the stock market crash? Or its impact on financial system balance sheets?
And aren't the two interpretations complementary rather than substitutes. Aren't assets and debts two sides of the same problem (the balance sheet problem)?
Credit Booms, Real Booms, Crashes and Recessions
My reading of the 1920's experience is that there was a credit boom which accompanied a real boom. The 1920's in the U.S. and other countries was a period of exceptionally rapid real growth. It was also a period when many new industries and products based on technologies developed earlier came to fruition. In that respect it is similar to the recent experience, although according to Gordon (2000) and David and Wright (1999) and others, the productivity boom of the 20's was more significant than today.
Also like the recent boom, it had to be financed somehow and it was, by bank credit, commercial paper and equities. It was also supported by a benign and stable macro policy stance, although the underlying gold standard produced a mild deflationary trend in gold prices unlike the low inflation of the 90's.
The question is did the credit boom (and also the stock market boom since it is difficult to tease them apart) --have to bust and produce a great depression, or could it have continued and kept financing the real growth that was occurring? Or could it have bust, as it did, but just lead to what Barry and I once termed 'a garden variety recession.'
There are 2 parts to this question. Did the boom have to bust? Recent work by Prescott and McGrattan (2002) , which follows an earlier study by Sirkin (1975) , suggests that U.S. stock market valuation in 1929 was fully justified by fundamentals which predicted productivity advances and real growth. They argue that tight Fed policy to stem the stock market boom was unnecessary. But even if there was a speculative (bubble) component to the run up in stock prices form 1927-29, and even if the Fed had followed preemptive policy to deflate the boom to prevent a worse bust down the road (possibly created through adverse balance sheet effects interacting with collateral constraints, as Olivier I argue (2002a, 2002b) ), did it have to produce the greatest depression of all time? The paper really does not adequately treat these issues.
In some research I did in a background paper for the April 2003 World Economic Outlook, I looked at the historical record for the U.S. and the U.K. from 1800-2000 on stock market crashes, recessions, productivity booms, and financial distress. What the record shows is that there were many crashes (20 for the U.S., 17 for the U.K.), that many of them, but not all, were associated with recessions. That only a few were associated with preceding productivity booms. The memorable episodes in the U.K.
were the 1825 Latin American mania and the 1840 railroad boom. For the U.S., it was cotton in the 1830's, railroads in the 1870's, and radio etc in the 1920s. That the severe recessions associated with asset price busts also were accompanied by banking panics in a policy environment without a lender of last resort and/or by severe financial distress as defined by an index developed by Wheelock (2002, 2003) . Finally with the principal exception of the 1920's none of these booms followed by busts led to a great depression.
Indeed the fact that the 1920's was the unique event in the historical record highlights the importance of the subject of the Eichengreen -Mitchener study. I am skeptical however that the severity of the recession that followed was caused by the magnitude of the preceding credit (asset price) boom as this paper suggests. The collapse in asset prices and the accompanying financing was likely relevant as an explanation for the first year of the slump, 1929 slump, -1930 slump, , as argued earlier by Romer (1993 , and others, but after that date, I posit that the U.S. banking panics which could have been prevented by appropriate expansionary monetary policy and the role of the gold standard as an international propagation mechanism and constraint on policy action by the rest of the world, became the salient feature . Indeed it was monetary policy failures that explain why the 20s experience was then followed by the greatest depression of all time.
The policy lessons from the 20s and 30s seemingly have been learned by today's policy makers (perhaps with the principal exception of Japan) which likely explains why the recent bust has (so far) not had serious real effects.
Problems with the Credit boom indicator
The authors construct an indicator of credit booms for the 1920s and then use it to measure the extent to which the recession that followed could be attributed to the boom.
Aside from the issues raised above which suggests that the exercise should have stopped with 1930, the year of recession before the banking panics and international factors took over, there are a number of serious problems with the indicator. These may be rectified by a more detailed discussion on why it is being used and how it is constructed, than is currently presented.
First, one variable used in the indicator, the broad money to GNP ratio is very problematic. M/Y is also Cambridge k, the inverse of velocity. Its variation is picking up very different forces. In the long-run, it is determined by real per capita income and various slower moving institutional factors such as demographics, the technology of the payments system, institutional restrictions on banking, financial innovation leading to the development of money substitutes etc (see Bordo and Jonung 1987) . Before World War II, V had a declining trend in many countries. Afterwards a rising trend. In the short-run it reflects expectations of economic stability and monetary policy and tends to be 
Sectoral Evidence (A) Construction and Land
The authors discuss the Florida land boom as an example of an asset price boom facilitated by easy credit. It was indeed an exciting event but in the grand scheme of things it had little impact on the U.S. economy. It was a purely local phenomenon or what Schwartz (1986) called a pseudo crisis. Indeed as Bordo and Jeanne (2002) show, an aggregate U.S. land price index for the 1920s does not show much of a boom and bust and its timing well preceded the slump.
The authors discuss the construction boom -bust of the 1920's as another aspect of the credit finance. According to R.A. Gordon (1974) .This variable was the fundamental cause of the Great Depression. Subsequent research e.g. Temin (1976) finds little evidence for its importance as a cause of the depression. and argue that many of them did not deliver on their promise. However to clearly make that case they need to refute the evidence of Prescott and McGrattan (2002) cited above.
The Gold Standard
The authors argue that the inter war gold standard was different than the pre war gold standard because it was a full blown gold exchange standard in which, foreign exchange reserves provided central banks greater scope for independent accomodative monetary policies hence encouraging foreign capital to finance credit booms.
Was this really different than the pre 1914 era? Massive investment booms occurred in the U.S. in the 1830's, and 1870's which were followed by busts as was the case for Argentina in the 1880s. Why was that earlier experience different from the 1920s? The answer I believe lies not in the differences in the size of the credit boom stressed here but in the severity of the bust. As Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) and Delargy and Goodhart (1999) show, the busts in Argentina in 1890, the U.S. in 1893, Italy 1907 were severe but nothing compared to the Great Depression. As mentioned above, it was the policy response after 1930 and not the credit boom that accounts for the consequences of that event.
